Abstract-The architecture of two-tiered sensor networks, where storage nodes serve as an intermediate tier between sensors and a sink for storing data and processing queries, has been widely adopted because of the benefits of power and storage saving for sensors as well as the efficiency of query processing. However, the importance of storage nodes also makes them attractive to attackers. In this paper, we propose SafeQ, a protocol that prevents attackers from gaining information from both sensor collected data and sink issued queries. SafeQ also allows a sink to detect compromised storage nodes when they misbehave. To preserve privacy, SafeQ uses a novel technique to encode both data and queries such that a storage node can correctly process encoded queries over encoded data without knowing their values. To preserve integrity, we propose two schemes-one using Merkle hash trees and another using a new data structure called neighborhood chains-to generate integrity verification information so that a sink can use this information to verify whether the result of a query contains exactly the data items that satisfy the query. To improve performance, we propose an optimization technique using Bloom filters to reduce the communication cost between sensors and storage nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION

W
IRELESS sensor networks (WSNs) have been widely deployed for various applications, such as environment sensing, building safety monitoring, earthquake predication, etc. In this paper, we consider a two-tiered sensor network architecture in which storage nodes gather data from nearby sensors and answer queries from the sink of the network. The storage nodes serve as an intermediate tier between the sensors and the sink for storing data and processing queries. Storage nodes bring three main benefits to sensor networks. First, sensors save power by sending all collected data to their closest storage node instead of sending them to the sink through long routes. Second, sensors can be memory-limited because data are mainly stored on storage nodes. Third, query processing becomes more efficient because the sink only communicates with storage nodes for queries. The inclusion of storage nodes in sensor networks was first introduced in [2] and has been widely adopted [3] - [7] . Several products of storage nodes, such as StarGate [8] and RISE [9] , are commercially available. However, the inclusion of storage nodes also brings significant security challenges. As storage nodes store data received from sensors and serve as an important role for answering queries, they are more vulnerable to be compromised, especially in a hostile environment. A compromised storage node imposes significant threats to a sensor network. First, the attacker may obtain sensitive data that has been, or will be, stored in the storage node. Second, the compromised storage node may return forged data for a query. Third, this storage node may not include all data items that satisfy the query.
Therefore, we want to design a protocol that prevents attackers from gaining information from both sensor collected data and sink issued queries, which typically can be modeled as range queries, and allows the sink to detect compromised storage nodes when they misbehave. For privacy, compromising a storage node should not allow the attacker to obtain the sensitive information that has been, and will be, stored in the node, as well as the queries that the storage node has received, and will receive. Note that we treat the queries from the sink as confidential because such queries may leak critical information about query issuers' interests, which need to be protected especially in military applications. For integrity, the sink needs to detect whether a query result from a storage node includes forged data items or does not include all the data that satisfy the query. There are two key challenges in solving the privacyand integrity-preserving range query problem. First, a storage node needs to correctly process encoded queries over encoded data without knowing their actual values. Second, a sink needs to verify that the result of a query contains all the data items that satisfy the query and does not contain any forged data.
Although important, the privacy-and integrity-preserving range query problem has been underinvestigated. The prior art solution to this problem was proposed by Sheng and Li in their recent seminal work [7] . We call it the "S&L scheme." This scheme has two main drawbacks: 1) it allows attackers to obtain a reasonable estimation on both sensor collected data and sink issued queries; and 2) the power consumption and storage space for both sensors and storage nodes grow exponentially with the number of dimensions of collected data. In this paper, we propose SafeQ, a novel privacy-and integrity-preserving range query protocol for two-tiered sensor networks. The ideas of SafeQ are fundamentally different from the S&L scheme.
To preserve privacy, SafeQ uses a novel technique to encode both data and queries such that a storage node can correctly process encoded queries over encoded data without knowing their actual values. To preserve integrity, we propose two schemes-one using Merkle hash trees and another using a new data structure called neighborhood chains-to generate integrity verification information such that a sink can use this information to verify whether the result of a query contains exactly the data items that satisfy the query. We also propose an optimization technique using Bloom filters to significantly reduce the communication cost between sensors and storage nodes. Furthermore, we propose a solution to adapt SafeQ for event-driven sensor networks, where a sensor submits data to its nearby storage node only when a certain event happens and the event may occur infrequently.
SafeQ excels state-of-the-art S&L scheme [7] in two aspects. First, SafeQ provides significantly better security and privacy. While prior art allows a compromised storage node to obtain a reasonable estimation on the value of sensor collected data and sink issued queries, SafeQ makes such estimation very difficult. Second, SafeQ delivers orders of magnitude better performance on both power consumption and storage space for multidimensional data, which are most common in practice as most sensors are equipped with multiple sensing modules such as temperature, humidity, pressure, etc.
We performed side-by-side comparison with prior art over a large real-world data set from Intel Lab [10] . Our results show that the power and space savings of SafeQ over prior art grow exponentially with the number of dimensions. For power consumption, for three-dimensional data, SafeQ consumes 184.9 times less power for sensors and 76.8 times less power for storage nodes. For space consumption on storage nodes, for three-dimensional data, SafeQ uses 182.4 times less space. Our experimental results conform with the analysis that the power and space consumption in the S&L scheme grow exponentially with the number of dimensions, whereas those in SafeQ grow linearly with the number of dimensions times the number of data items.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Privacy and Integrity Preserving in WSNs
Privacy-and integrity-preserving range queries in WSNs have drawn people's attention recently [7] , [11] , [12] . Sheng and Li proposed a scheme to preserve the privacy and integrity of range queries in sensor networks [7] . This scheme uses the bucket-partitioning idea proposed by Hacigumus et al. in [13] for database privacy. The basic idea is to divide the domain of data values into multiple buckets, the size of which is computed based on the distribution of data values and the location of sensors. In each time-slot, a sensor collects data items from the environment, places them into buckets, encrypts them together in each bucket, and then sends each encrypted bucket along with its bucket ID to a nearby storage node. For each bucket that has no data items, the sensor sends an encoding number, which can be used by the sink to verify that the bucket is empty, to a nearby storage node. When the sink wants to perform a range query, it finds the smallest set of bucket IDs that contains the range in the query, then sends the set as the query to storage nodes. Upon receiving the bucket IDs, the storage node returns the corresponding encrypted data in all those buckets. The sink can then decrypt the encrypted buckets and verify the integrity using encoding numbers. The S&L scheme only considered one-dimensional data in [7] , and it can be extended to handle multidimensional data by dividing the domain of each dimension into multiple buckets.
The S&L scheme has two main drawbacks inherited from the bucket-partitioning technique. First, as pointed out in [14] , the bucket-partitioning technique allows compromised storage nodes to obtain a reasonable estimation on the actual value of both data items and queries. In SafeQ, such estimations are very difficult. Second, for multidimensional data, the power consumption of both sensors and storage nodes, as well as the space consumption of storage nodes, increases exponentially with the number of dimensions due to the exponential increase of the number of buckets. In SafeQ, power and space consumption increases linearly with the number of dimensions times the number of data items.
Shi et al. proposed an optimized version of S&L's integritypreserving scheme aiming to reduce the communication cost between sensors and storage nodes [11] , [12] . The basic idea of their optimization is that each sensor uses a bit map to represent which buckets have data and broadcasts its bit map to the nearby sensors. Each sensor attaches the bit maps received from others to its own data items and encrypts them together. The sink verifies query result integrity for a sensor by examining the bit maps from its nearby sensors. In our experiments, we did not choose the solutions in [11] and [12] for side-by-side comparison for two reasons. First, the techniques used in [11] and [12] are similar to the S&L scheme except the optimization for integrity verification. The way they extend the S&L scheme to handle multidimensional data is to divide the domain of each dimension into multiple buckets. They inherit the same weakness of allowing compromised storage nodes to estimate the values of data items and queries with the S&L scheme. Second, their optimization technique allows a compromised sensor to easily compromise the integrity verification functionality of the network by sending falsified bit maps to sensors and storage nodes. In contrast, in S&L and our schemes, a compromised sensor cannot jeopardize the querying and verification of data collected by other sensors.
B. Privacy Preserving in Databases
Database privacy has been studied in prior work [13] - [17] . Hacigumus et al. first proposed the bucket partitioning idea for querying encrypted data in the database-as-service model (DAS), where sensitive data are outsourced to an untrusted server [13] . Agrawal et al. further used the bucket-partitioning idea to investigate range queries on numerical data [15] . Hore et al. explored the optimal partitioning of buckets [14] . However, they have the same two drawbacks as we discussed above. Boneh and Waters proposed a public-key system for supporting conjunctive, subset, and range queries on encrypted data [18] . Although theoretically this seems possible, Boneh and Waters's scheme cannot be used to solve our privacy problem because it is too expensive for sensor networks. It would require a sensor to perform encryption for each data submission, where is the number of dimensions and is the domain size (i.e., the number of all possible values) of each dimension. Here, could be large, and each encryption is expensive due to the use of public key cryptography.
C. Integrity Preserving in Databases
Database integrity has also been explored in prior work [19] - [24] , independent of the privacy issues. It focuses on verifying the completeness of the result of relational database queries. Merkle hash trees have been used for the authentication of data elements [25] , and they were used for verifying the integrity of database queries in [19] and [20] . Pang et al. [21] and Narasimha and Tsudik [22] proposed similar schemes for verifying the integrity of relational database query results using signature aggregation and chaining. For each tuple in a database, Pang et al. computed the signature of the tuple by signing the concatenation of the digests of the tuple itself as well as the tuple's left and right neighbors [21] . Narasimha and Tsudik computed the signature by signing the concatenation of the digests of the tuple and its left neighbors along each dimension [22] . Although our neighborhood chaining technique seems similar to the above signature aggregation and chaining technique, it is much more efficient and suitable for sensor networks. First, our technique concatenates a data item with its left neighbor without computing their digests. Second, our technique does not compute signatures, which require the use of computationally expensive public key cryptography.
Chen et al. proposed canonical range trees (CRTs) to store the counting information for multidimensional data such that this counting information can be used for integrity verification without leaking boundary information [24] . However, protecting boundary information is unnecessary in our context because the sink can access all data collected by sensors. Therefore, the price for protecting boundary information is unnecessary. Chen's solution requires each sensor to compute and send an encrypted multidimensional CRT with approximately overhead to a storage node, where is the number of data items. Therefore, it incurs too much communication cost between sensors and storage nodes.
D. Secure File Systems on Untrusted Servers
Secure file systems on untrusted servers have been studied in prior work (e.g., [26] and [27] ), which aims to design a system where users can store their files on an untrusted server and the server cannot read the content of the files. These solutions cannot solve our secure range query problem because, in such work, the untrusted server is not able to process queries over the files. In contrast, processing queries in a privacy-preserving manner at storage nodes is our main design goal for SafeQ.
III. MODELS AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. System Model
We consider two-tired sensor networks as illustrated in Fig. 1 . A two-tired sensor network consists of three types of nodes: sensors, storage nodes, and a sink. Sensors are inexpensive sensing devices with limited storage and computing power. They are often massively distributed in a field for collecting physical or environmental data, e.g., temperature. Storage nodes are powerful wireless devices that are equipped with much more storage capacity and computing power than sensors. Each sensor periodically sends collected data to its nearby storage node. The sink is the point of contact for users of the sensor network. Each time the sink receives a question from a user, it first translates the question into multiple queries and then disseminates the queries to the corresponding storage nodes, which process the queries based on their data and return the query results to the sink. The sink unifies the query results from multiple storage nodes into the final answer and sends it back to the user.
We assume that sensors and storage nodes are loosely synchronized with the sink. With loose synchronization, we divide time into fixed duration intervals, and every sensor collects data once per time interval. From a starting time that all sensors and the sink agree upon, every time intervals form a time-slot. From the same starting time, after a sensor collects data for times, it sends a message that contains a 3-tuple , where is the sensor ID and is the sequence number of the time-slot in which the data items are collected by sensor . We address privacyand integrity-preserving ranges queries for event-driven sensor networks, where a sensor only submits data to a nearby storage node when a certain event happens, in Section IX. We further assume that the queries from the sink are range queries. A range query "finding all the data items collected at time-slot in the range " is denoted as . Note that the queries in most sensor network applications can be easily modeled as range queries. Table I shows the notation used in this paper.
B. Threat Model
For a two-tiered sensor network, we assume that the sensors and the sink are trusted, but the storage nodes are not. In a hostile environment, both sensors and storage nodes can be compromised. If a sensor is compromised, the subsequent collected data of the sensor will be known to the attacker, and the compromised sensor may send forged data to its closest storage node. It is extremely difficult to prevent such attacks without the use of tamper-proof hardware. However, the data from one sensor constitute a small fraction of the collected data of the whole sensor network. Therefore, we mainly focus on the scenario where a storage node is compromised. Compromising a storage node can cause much greater damage to the sensor network than compromising a sensor. After a storage node is compromised, the large quantity of data stored on the node will be known to the attacker, and upon receiving a query from the sink, the compromised storage node may return a falsified result formed by including forged data or excluding legitimate data. Therefore, attackers are more motivated to compromise storage nodes.
C. Problem Statement
The fundamental problem for a two-tired sensor network is the following: How can we design the storage scheme and the query protocol in a privacy-and integrity-preserving manner? A satisfactory solution to this problem should meet the following two requirements.
1) Data and query privacy: Data privacy means that a storage node cannot know the actual values of sensor collected data. This ensures that an attacker cannot understand the data stored on a compromised storage node. Query privacy means that a storage node cannot know the actual value of sink issued queries. This ensures that an attacker cannot understand, or deduce useful information from, the queries that a compromised storage node receives. 2) Data integrity: If a query result that a storage node sends to the sink includes forged data or excludes legitimate data, the query result is guaranteed to be detected by the sink as invalid. Besides these two hard requirements, a desirable solution should have low power and space consumption because these wireless devices have limited resources.
IV. PRIVACY FOR ONE-DIMENSIONAL DATA
To preserve privacy, it seems natural to have sensors encrypt data and the sink encrypt queries. However, the key challenge is how a storage node processes encrypted queries over encrypted data.
The idea of our solution for preserving privacy is illustrated in Fig. 2 . We assume that each sensor in a network shares a secret key with the sink. For the data items that a sensor collects in time-slot first encrypts the data items using key , the results of which are represented as . Then, applies a "magic" function to the data items and obtains . The message that the sensor sends to its closest storage node includes both the encrypted data and the associative information . When the sink wants to perform query on a storage node, the sink applies another "magic" function on the range and sends to the storage node. The storage node processes the query over encrypted data collected at time-slot using another "magic" function . The three "magic" functions , and satisfy the following three conditions. 1) A data item is in range if and only if is true. This condition allows the storage node to decide whether should be included in the query result.
2) Given and , it is computationally infeasible for the storage node to compute . This condition guarantees data privacy.
3) Given
, it is computationally infeasible for the storage node to compute . This condition guarantees query privacy.
A. Prefix Membership Verification
The building block of our privacy-preserving scheme is the prefix membership verification scheme first introduced in [28] and later formalized in [29] . The idea of this scheme is to convert the verification of whether a number is in a range to several verifications of whether two numbers are equal. A prefix with leading 0's and 1's followed by 's is called a -prefix. For example, 1*** is a 1-prefix, and it denotes the range . If a value matches a -prefix (i.e., is in the range denoted by the prefix), the first bits of and the -prefix are the same. For example, if 1*** (i.e., ), then the first bit of must be 1. Given a binary number of bits, the prefix family of this number is defined as the set of prefixes , where the th prefix is . The prefix family of is denoted as . For example, the prefix family of number 12 is . Prefix membership verification is based on the fact that for any number and prefix if and only if . To verify whether a number is in a range , we first convert the range to a minimum set of prefixes, denoted , such that the union of the prefixes is equal to . For example, . Given a range , where and are two numbers of bits, the number of prefixes in is at most [30] . Second, we compute the prefix family for number . Thus, if and only if . To verify whether using only the operations of verifying whether two numbers are equal, we convert each prefix to a corresponding unique number using a prefix numericalization function. A prefix numericalization function needs to satisfy the following two properties: 1) for any prefix is a binary string; 2) for any two prefixes and if and only if . There are many ways to do prefix numericalization. We use the prefix numericalization scheme defined in [31] . Given a prefix of bits, we first insert 1 after . The bit 1 represents a separator between and . Second, we replace every * by 0. Note that if there is no * in a prefix, we add 1 at the end of this prefix. For example, is converted to 11100. Given a set of prefixes , we use to denote the resulting set of numericalized prefixes. Therefore, if and only if . Fig. 3 illustrates the process of verifying .
B. Submission Protocol
The submission protocol concerns how a sensor sends its data to a storage node. Let be data items that sensor collects at a time-slot. Each item is in the range , where and denote the lower and upper bounds, respectively, for all possible data items that a sensor may collect. The values of and are known to both sensors and the sink. After collecting data items, performs the following steps. 1) Sort the data items in an ascending order. For simplicity, we assume . If some data items have the same value, we simply represent them as one data item annotated with the number of such data items.
2) Convert the ranges to their corresponding prefix representation, i.e., compute . 3) Numericalize all prefixes. That is, compute . 4) Compute the keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) of each numericalized prefix using key , which is known to all sensors and the sink. Examples of HMAC implementations include HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA1 [32] - [34] . An HMAC function using key , denoted , satisfies the one-wayness property (i.e., given , it is computationally infeasible to compute and ) and the collision resistance property (i.e., it is computationally infeasible to find two distinct numbers and such that ). Given a set of numbers , we use to denote the resulting set of numbers after applying function to every number in . In summary, this step computes . 5) Encrypt every data item with key , i.e., compute . 6) Sensor sends the encrypted data along with to its closest storage node. The above steps show that the aforementioned "magic" function is defined as follows:
Due to the one-wayness and collision resistance properties of the HMAC function, given and the encrypted data items , the storage node cannot compute the value of any data item.
C. Query Protocol
The query protocol concerns how the sink sends a range query to a storage node. When the sink wants to perform query on a storage node, it performs the following four steps. Note that any range query satisfies the condition . The above steps show that the aforementioned "magic" function is defined as follows:
Because of the one-wayness and collision resistance properties of the HMAC function, the storage node cannot compute and from the query that it receives.
D. Query Processing
Upon receiving query , the storage node processes this query on the data items received from each nearby sensor at time-slot based on the following theorem. . Second, the sink converts a given range query to a set of prefixes , and then applies the numericalization and hash functions . Finally, the storage node checks whether has a common element with . However, this privacy-preserving scheme is not compatible with the integrity-preserving scheme that we will discuss in Section V because this privacy-preserving scheme does not allow storage nodes to identify the positions of and (from the range query ) among if no data item satisfies the query, while our integrity-preserving scheme requires storage nodes to know such information in order to compute integrity verification objects.
V. INTEGRITY FOR ONE-DIMENSIONAL DATA
The meaning of data integrity is twofold in this context. In the result that a storage node sends to the sink in responding to a query, first, the storage node cannot include any data item that does not satisfy the query; second, the storage node cannot exclude any data item that satisfies the query. To allow the sink to verify the integrity of a query result, the query response from a storage node to the sink consists of two parts: 1) the query result , which includes all the encrypted data items that satisfy the query; 2) the verification object , which includes information for the sink to verify the integrity of . To achieve this purpose, we propose two schemes based on two different techniques: Merkle hash trees and neighborhood chains.
A. Integrity Scheme Using Merkle Hash Trees
Our first integrity-preserving mechanism is based on Merkle hash trees [25] . Each time a sensor sends data items to storage nodes, it constructs a Merkle hash tree for the data items. Fig. 4 shows a Merkle hash tree constructed for eight data items. Suppose sensor wants to send encrypted data items to a storage node. Sensor first builds a Merkle hash tree for the data items, which is a complete binary tree. The terminal nodes are , where for every . Function is a one-way hash function such as MD5 [33] or SHA-1 [34] . The value of each nonterminal node , whose children are and , is the hash of the concatenation of 's value and 's value. For example, in Fig. 4 , . Note that if the number of data items is not a power of 2, interim hash values that do not have a sibling value to which they may be concatenated are promoted, without any change, up the tree until a sibling is found. Note that the resulting Merkle hash tree will not be balanced. For the example Merkle hash tree in Fig. 4 , if we remove the nodes , and let , the resulting unbalanced tree is the Merkle hash tree for five data items.
The Merkle hash tree used in our solution has two special properties that allow the sink to verify query result integrity. First, the value of the root is computed using a keyed HMAC function, where the key is , the key shared between sensor and the sink. For example, in Fig. 4 , . Using a keyed HMAC function gives us the property that only sensor and the sink can compute the root value. Second, the terminal nodes are arranged in an ascending order based on the value of each data item . We first discuss what a sensor needs to send to its nearest storage node along its data items. Each time sensor wants to send encrypted data items to a storage node, it first computes a Merkle hash tree over the encrypted data items, and then sends the root value along with the encrypted data items to a storage node. Note that among all the nodes in the Merkle hash tree, only the root is sent from sensor to the storage node because the storage node can compute all other nodes in the Merkle hash tree by itself.
Next, we discuss what a storage node needs to send to the sink along a query result, i.e., what should be included in a verification object. For the storage node that is near to sensor , each time it receives a query from the sink, it first finds the data items that are in the range . Second, it computes the Merkle hash tree (except the root) from the data items. Third, it sends the query result and the verification object to the sink. Given data items in a storage node, where , and a range , where and , and the query result , the storage node should include and in the verification object because and ensure that the query result does include all data items that satisfy the query as the query result is bounded by them. We call the left bound of the query result, and the right bound of the query result. Note that the left bound and the right bound may not exist. If , the left bound does not exist; if , the right bound does not exist. The verification object includes zero to two encrypted data items and proof nodes in the Merkel hash tree that are needed for the sink to verify the integrity of the query result. Taking the example in Fig. 5 , suppose a storage node has received eight data items that sensor collected at time , and the sink wants to perform the query on the storage node. Using Theorem 4.1, the storage node finds that the query result includes , and , which satisfy the query. Along with the query result (i.e., the three data items), the storage node also sends , and , which are marked gray in Fig. 5 , to the sink as the verification object.
Next, we discuss how the sink uses Merkle hash trees to verify query result integrity. Upon receiving a query result and its verification object, the sink computes the root value of the Merkle hash tree and then verifies the integrity of the query result. Query result integrity is preserved if and only if the following four conditions hold. 1) The data items in the query result do satisfy the query. 2) If the left bound exists, verify that and is the nearest left neighbor of in the Merkle hash tree; otherwise, verify that is the leftmost encrypted data item in the Merkle hash tree.
3) If the right bound exists, verify that and is the nearest right neighbor of in the Merkle hash tree; otherwise, verify that is the rightmost encrypted data item in the Merkle hash tree. 4) The computed root value is the same as the root value included in . Note that sorting data items is critical in our scheme for ensuring the integrity of query result. Without this property, it is difficult for a storage node to prove query result integrity without sending all data items to the sink.
B. Integrity Scheme Using Neighborhood Chains
We first present a new data structure called neighborhood chains and then discuss its use in integrity verification. Given data items , where , we call the list of items encrypted using key , t h e neighborhood chain for the data items. Here " " denotes concatenation. For any item in the chain, we call the value of the item, and the right neighbor of the item. Fig. 6 shows the neighborhood chain for the five data items 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9.
Preserving query result integrity using neighborhood chaining works as follows. After collecting data items , sensor sends the corresponding neighborhood chain , instead of , to a storage node. Given a range query , the storage node computes as usual. The corresponding verification object only consists of the right neighbor of the largest data item in . Note that always consists of one item for any query. If , then ; if , suppose , then . After the sink receives and , it verifies the integrity of as follows. First, the sink verifies that every item in satisfies the query. Assume that the sink wants to perform the range query over the data items in Fig. 6 . The storage node calculates to be and to be . Second, the sink verifies that the storage node has not excluded any item that satisfies the query. Let be the correct query result and be the query result from the storage node. We consider the following four cases. 1) If there exists such that , the sink can detect this error because the items in do not form a neighborhood chain.
2) If
, the sink can detect this error because it knows the existence of from and satisfies the query.
3) If , the sink can detect this error because it knows the existence of from the item in and satisfies the query.
4) If
, the sink can verify this fact because the item in should satisfy the property .
VI. QUERIES OVER MULTIDIMENSIONAL DATA
Sensor collected data and sink issued queries are typically multidimensional as most sensors are equipped with multiple sensing modules such as temperature, humidity, pressure, etc. A -dimensional data item is a -tuple , where each is the value for the th dimension (i.e., attribute). A -dimensional range query consists of subqueries , where each subquery is a range over the th dimension.
A. Privacy for Multidimensional Data
We extend our privacy-preserving techniques for one-dimensional data to multidimensional data as follows. Let denote the -dimensional data items that a sensor collects at time-slot , where . First, encrypts these data with its secret key . Second, for each dimension applies the "magic" function and obtains . At last, sends the encrypted data items and to a nearby storage node. For example, sensor collects five two-dimensional data items (1, 11), (3, 5) , (6, 8) , (7, 1) , and (9, 4) at time-slot , and it will send the encrypted data items as well as and to a nearby storage node. When the sink wants to perform query on a storage node, the sink applies the "magic" function on each subquery and sends to the storage node. The storage node then applies the "magic" function to find the query result for each subquery . Here, the three "magic" functions , and are the same as the "magic" functions defined in Section IV. Finally, the storage node computes as the query result. Considering the above example, given a range query ( [2, 7] , [3, 8] ), the query result for the subquery [2, 6] is the encrypted data items of (3, 5), (6, 8) and the query result for the subquery [3, 8] is the encrypted data items of (9, 4), (3, 5) , (6, 8) . Therefore, the query result is the encrypted data items of (3, 5), (6, 8) .
B. Integrity for Multidimensional Data
We next present two integrity-preserving schemes for multidimensional data: One builds a Merkle hash tree for each dimension, and the other builds a multidimensional neighborhood chain.
1) Integrity Scheme Using Merkle Hash Trees:
To preserve integrity, sensor first computes Merkle hash trees over the encrypted data items along dimensions. In the th Merkle hash tree, the data items are sorted according to the values of the th attribute. Second, sends the root values to a storage node along with the encrypted data items. For a storage node that is near to sensor , each time it receives a query , it first finds the query result for each range . Second, it chooses the query result that contains the smallest number of encrypted data items 
among
. Third, it computes the Merkle hash tree in which the data items are sorted according to the th attribute. Finally, it sends and the corresponding verification object to the sink. For example, suppose a sensor collects four two-dimensional data items in a time-slot. Sensor computes a Merkle hash tree along each dimension. Fig. 7 shows the two Merkle hash trees. Given a two-dimensional range query , the storage node can find the query results based on the first attribute and based on the second attribute. Since only contains one encrypted data item, the storage node sends to the sink the query result and the corresponding verification object . Note that the query result of a multidimensional range query may contain data items that do not satisfy the query. After decryption, the sink can easily prune the query result by discarding such data items.
2) Integrity Scheme Using Neighborhood Chains: The basic idea is that for each of the values in a data item, we find its nearest left neighbor along each dimension and embed this information when we encrypt the item. Such neighborhood information is used by the sink for integrity verification.
We first present multidimensional neighborhood chains and then discuss its use in integrity verification. Let , where for each , denote -dimensional data items. We use and to denote the lower bound and the upper bound of any data item along dimension . We call and the lower bound and upper bound of the data items. For each dimension , we can sort the values of data items along the th dimension together with and in an ascending order. For ease of presentation, we assume for every dimension . In this sorted list, we call the left neighboring value of . We use to denote the left neighboring value of along dimension . A multidimensional neighborhood chain for is constructed by encrypting every item as , which is denoted as . We call the value of . Note that when multiple data items have the same value along the th dimension, we annotate with the number of such items in . The list of items encrypted with key forms a multidimensional neighborhood chain. The nice property of a multidimensional neighborhood chain is that all data items form a neighborhood chain along every dimension. This property allows the sink to verify the integrity of query results. Considering five example two-dimensional data items (1, 11) , (3, 5) , (6, 8) , (7, 1) , (9, 4) with lower bound (0, 0) and upper bound (15, 15) , the corresponding multidimensional neighborhood chain encrypted with key is , and
. Fig. 8 illustrates this chain, where each black point denotes an item, two gray points denote the lower and upper bounds, solid arrows illustrate the chain along -dimension, and dashed arrows illustrate the chain along -dimension.
Next, we discuss the operations carried on sensors, storage nodes, and the sink using multidimensional chaining.
Sensors: After collecting -dimensional data items at timeslot , sensor computes the multidimensional chain for the items and sends it to a storage node.
Storage Nodes: Given a -dimensional query , a storage node first computes . Second, it computes , where is the smallest set among (i.e., for any ) and is the right bounding item of the range . Given a multidimensional chain and a subquery along dimension , the right bounding item of is the item where . Fig. 8 shows a query ( [2, 6] , [3, 8] ) with a query result and . Sink: Upon receiving and , the sink verifies the integrity of as follows. First, it verifies that every item in satisfies the query. Second, it verifies that the storage node has not excluded any item that satisfies the query based on the following three properties.
1) The items in should form a chain along one dimension, say . Thus, if the storage node excludes an item whose value in the th dimension is in the middle of this chain, this chaining property would be violated.
2) The item in that has the smallest value among the th dimension, say , satisfies the condition that . Thus, if the storage node excludes the item whose value on the th dimension is the beginning of the chain, this property would be violated.
3) There exists only one item in that is the right bounding item of . Thus, if the storage node excludes the item whose value on the th dimension is the end of the chain, this property would be violated.
VII. SAFEQ OPTIMIZATION
We present an optimization technique based on Bloom filters [35] to reduce the communication cost between sensors and storage nodes. This cost can be significant because of two reasons. First, in each submission, a sensor needs to convert each range , where and are two numbers of bits, to prefix numbers in the worst case. Second, the sensor applies HMAC to each prefix number, which results in a 128-bit string if we choose HMAC-MD5 or a 160-bit string if we choose HMAC-SHA1. Reducing communication cost for sensors is important because of power consumption.
Our basic idea is to use a Bloom filter to represent . Thus, a sensor only needs to send the Bloom filter instead of the hashes to a storage node. The number of bits needed to represent the Bloom filter is much smaller than that needed to represent the hashes. Next, we discuss the operations that sensors and storage nodes need to perform in using this optimization technique.
Sensors: Let be a bit array of size representing the Bloom filter for that a sensor computes after collecting data items assuming . Let be an array of pointers. For every and for every number in , the sensor applies hash functions on , where each hash function hashes to an integer in the range , and then sets to be 1 and appends the index to the list that points to. In each submission, the sensor sends and to its closest storage node. For example, and can be represented as the two arrays in Fig. 9 , where "-" denotes an empty pointer. Note that and . The logical meaning of is an array of pointers, each pointing to a list of indices from 0 to . To reduce the space used for storing pointers, we implement as a concatenation of all these lists separated by delimiters. For example, we can represent the array in Fig. 9 as a list . Storage Nodes: Recall that if and only if . If , then there exists at least one number in such that the following two conditions hold: 1) for every is 1; 2) for every , index is included in the list to which points. For example, to verify whether using the Bloom filter in Fig. 9 , a storage node can apply the three hash functions to each number in . For one number in , the storage node verifies that satisfies the above two conditions, therefore . Although, using our optimization technique, may contain data items that do not satisfy the query, they can be easily pruned by the sink after decryption. Given a query , using this optimization technique, a storage node may find multiple ranges that contain and multiple ranges that contain due to false positives of Bloom filters. In this case, the storage node uses the first range that contains and the last range that contains to compute the query result.
Bloom filters introduce false positives in the result of a query, i.e., the data items that do not satisfy the query. We can control the false positive rate by adjusting Bloom filter parameters. Let denote the average false positive rate and denote the bit length of each number in . For simplicity, we assume that each set contains the same number of values, which is denoted as . The upper bound of the average false positive rate is shown in (1), the derivation of which is in Section VIII (1) To represent , without Bloom filters, the total number of bits required is ; with Bloom filters, the total number of bits required is at most , the calculation of which is in Section VIII. Therefore, our optimization technique reduces the communication cost if (2) Fig. 10 shows that the upper bound of the false positive rate decreases as the number of data items increases or the number of hash functions increases. Based on (1) and (2), assuming and , to achieve reduction on the communication cost of sensors and the small false positive rate of %, we choose and to be . Note that only when , which is unlikely to happen, such does not exist.
VIII. ANALYSIS OF SAFEQ OPTIMIZATION
Let be the sets of data items that a sensor needs to represent in a Bloom filter. Let be the range query over the data items . Let denote the bit length of each , and . Let denote the bit length of the numbers after hashing in each . Let be the number of hash functions in the Bloom filter.
Given two arrays and representing data in , for any of bits, a storage node searches the corresponding index for by applying the hash functions to and check whether two conditions hold: 1) for every ; 2) for every , index is included in the list to which points. Let denote the index that the storage node finds for : If the index exists (i.e., the above conditions hold), ; otherwise, . Based on the analysis of Bloom filters [35] , the probability is . The probability is . Therefore, we have (3) As is the same for any , let denote the probability . According to our discussion in Section IV-A, each of the two sets and includes -bit numbers. For , there exists a range such that . Therefore, there exists one number in such that . Let denote the rest of the numbers in and denote the minimum index in . Without loss of generality, we assume is the minimum index. The probability of can be computed as follows:
or Similarly, for , there exists a range such that . Therefore, there exists one number in such that . Let denote the rest numbers in and denote the maximum index in . Without loss of generality, we assume is the maximum index. We have or Given a query , if the storage node can find or where , the query result has false positives. Therefore, the average false positive rate can be computed as follows: or or (4)
Because
, and , we derive (1) from the following calculation:
Typically, we choose the value to minimize the probability of false positive for Bloom filters. Thus, (1) becomes (5) Next, we discuss under what condition our optimization technique reduces the communication cost between sensors and storage nodes. To represent data in the sets , without Bloom filters, the total number of bits required is ; with Bloom filters, the total number of bits required is at most . Note that the number of bits for representing array is , and the number of bits for representing array is at most . Therefore, we derive (2) (6) In case that , (2) becomes (7) IX. QUERIES IN EVENT-DRIVEN NETWORKS So far, we have assumed that at each time-slot, a sensor sends to a storage node the data that it collected at that time-slot. However, this assumption does not hold for event-driven networks, where a sensor only reports data to a storage node when a certain event happens. If we directly apply our solution here, then the sink cannot verify whether a sensor collected data at a time-slot. The case that a sensor did not submit any data at time-slot and the case that the storage node discards all the data that the sensor collected at time-slot are not distinguishable for the sink.
We address the above challenge by sensors reporting their idle period to storage node each time when they submit data after an idle period or when the idle period is longer than a threshold. Storage nodes can use such idle period reported by sensors to prove to the sink that a sensor did not submit any data at any time-slot in that idle period. Next, we discuss the operations carried on sensors, storage nodes, and the sink.
Sensors: An idle period for a sensor is a time-slot interval , which indicates that the sensor has no data to submit from to , including and . Let be the threshold of a sensor being idle without reporting to a storage node. Suppose the last time that sensor submitted data or reported idle period is time-slot . At any time-slot acts based on three cases.
1) : In this case, if has data to submit, then it just submits the data; otherwise, it takes no action.
2)
: In this case, if has data to submit, then it submits data along with encrypted idle period ; otherwise, it takes no action. We call an idle proof.
3)
: In this case, if has data to submit, then it submits data along with the idle proof ; otherwise, it submits the idle proof . Fig. 11 illustrates idle periods for sensor , where each unit in the time axis is a time-slot, a gray unit denotes that has data to submit, and a blank unit denotes that has no data to submit. According to case 2, at time-slot submits data along with the idle proof . According to case 3, at time-slot submits the idle proof . Storage Nodes: When a storage node receives a query from the sink, it first checks whether has submitted data at time-slot . If has, then the storage node sends the query result as discussed in Section IV. Otherwise, the storage node checks whether has submitted an idle proof for an idle period containing time-slot . If true, then it sends the idle proof to the sink as . Otherwise, it replies to the sink saying that it does not have the idle proof containing time-slot at this moment, but once the right idle proof is received, it will forward to the sink. The maximum number of time-slots that the sink may need to wait for the right idle proof is . Here, is a system parameter trading off efficiency and the amount of time that the sink may have to wait for verifying data integrity. Smaller favors the sink for integrity verification, and larger favors sensors for power saving because of less communication cost.
Sink: Changes on the sink side are minimal. In the case that lacks the idle proof for verifying the integrity of , it will defer the verification for at most time-slots, during which benign storage nodes are guaranteed to send the needed idle proof. 
A. Complexity Analysis
Assume that a sensor collects -dimensional data items in a time-slot, each attribute of a data item is a -bit number, and the HMAC result of each numericalized prefix is a number. The computation cost, communication cost, and storage space of SafeQ are described in Table II . Note that the communication cost denotes the number of bytes sent for each submission or query, and the storage space denotes the number of bytes stored in a storage node for each submission. Furthermore, note that whether sensor nodes report to storage nodes periodically or upon some events has no impact on these costs of one time sending of data items.
B. Privacy Analysis
In a SafeQ protected two-tiered sensor network, compromising a storage node does not allow the attacker to obtain the actual values of sensor collected data and sink issued queries. The correctness of this claim is based on the fact that the hash functions and encryption algorithms used in SafeQ are secure. In the submission protocol, a storage node only receives encrypted data items and the secure hash values of prefixes converted from the data items. Without knowing the keys used in the encryption and secure hashing, it is computationally infeasible to compute the actual values of sensor collected data and the corresponding prefixes. In the query protocol, a storage node only receives the secure hash values of prefixes converted from a range query. Without knowing the key used in the secure hashing, it is computationally infeasible to compute the actual values of sink issued queries.
Next, we analyze information leaking if does not satisfy the one-wayness property. More formally, given , where and is a numericalized prefix, suppose that a storage node takes steps to compute . Recall that the number of HMAC hashes sent from a sensor is . To reveal a data item , the storage node needs to reveal all the numericalized prefixes in . Thus, to reveal data items, the storage node would take steps. Here, for HMAC. Note that if a storage node and a sensor are both compromised, the storage node may reveal the sensor collected data and sink issued queries by employing brute-force attacks. In this case, the storage node knows the shared secret key for the function. Due to the one-wayness property of , the storage node cannot reveal directly using and . However, it can compute the results of the numericalized prefixes for all possible values in the data domain in a brute-force manner, and then compare the results with the received data and queries. Based on the comparison, the storage node can reveal the sensor collected data and sink issued queries. However, in practice, this computational cost could be prohibitive for a large data domain.
C. Integrity Analysis
For our scheme using Merkle hash trees, the correctness of this claim is based on the property that any change of leaf nodes in a Merkle hash tree will change the root value. Recall that the leaf nodes in a Merkle hash tree are sorted according to their values. In a query response, the left bound of the query result (if it exists), the query result, and the right bound of the query result (if it exists) must be consecutive leaf nodes in the Merkle hash tree. If the storage node includes forged data in the query result or excludes a legitimate data item from the query result, the root value computed at the sink will be different from the root value computed at the corresponding sensor.
For our scheme using neighborhood chains, the correctness of this claim is based on the following three properties that and should satisfy for a query. First, items in form a chain. Excluding any item in the middle or changing any item violates the chaining property. Second, the first item in contains the value of its left neighbor, which should be out of the range query on the smaller end. Third, the last item in contains the value of its right neighbor, which should be out of the range query on the larger end.
XI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Evaluation Setup
We implemented both SafeQ and the S&L scheme using TOSSIM [36] , a widely used wireless sensor network simulator. We measured the efficiency of SafeQ and the S&L scheme on one-, two-, and three-dimensional data. For better comparison, we conducted our experiments on the same data set that S&L used in their experiment [7] . The data set was chosen from a large real data set from Intel Lab [10] , and it consists of the temperature, humidity, and voltage data collected by 44 nodes during March [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 2004 . Each data attribute follows Gaussian distribution. Note that S&L only conducted experiments on the temperature data, while we experimented with both SafeQ and S&L schemes on one-dimensional data (of temperature), two-dimensional data (of temperature and humidity), and three-dimensional data (of temperature, humidity, and voltage). As in [7] , we equally divided 44 nodes into four groups and deployed a storage node for each group. Fig. 12 shows the network topology. The locations of sensors can be found in [10] .
In implementing SafeQ, we used HMAC-MD5 [32] with 128-bit keys as the hash function for hashing prefix numbers. We used the DES encryption algorithm in implementing both SafeQ and the S&L scheme. In implementing our Bloom filter optimization technique, we chose the number of hash functions to be 4 (i.e., ), which guarantees that the false positive rate induced by the Bloom filter is less than 1%. In implementing the S&L scheme, we used the parameter values (i.e., and ), which are corresponding to the minimum false positives of query results in their experiments, for computing optimal bucket partitions as in [7] , and we used HMAC-MD5 with 128-bit keys as the hash function for computing encoding number. For multidimensional data, we used their optimal bucket partition algorithm to partition multidimensional data along each dimension. In our experiments, we experimented with different sizes of time-slots ranging from 10 to 80 min. For each time-slot, we generated 1000 random range queries in the form of , where are two random values of temperature, are two random values of humidity, and are two random values of voltage.
B. Evaluation Results
The experimental results from our side-by-side comparison show that SafeQ significantly outperforms the S&L scheme for multidimensional data in terms of power and space consumption. For the two integrity-preserving schemes, the neighborhood-chaining technique is better than Merkle hash tree technique in terms of both power and space consumption. The rationale for us to include the Merkle hash-tree-based scheme is that Merkle hash trees are the typical approach to achieving integrity. We use SafeQ-MHT+ and SafeQ-MHT to denote our schemes using Merkle hash trees with and without Bloom filters, respectively, and we use SafeQ-NC+ and SafeQ-NC to denote our schemes using neighborhood chains with and without Bloom filters, respectively. Fig. 13(a) -(c) shows the average power consumption of sensors for three-, two-, and one-dimensional data, respectively, versus different sizes of time-slots. Fig. 14(a)-(c) shows the average power consumption of storage nodes for three-, two-, and one-dimensional data, respectively, versus different sizes of time-slots. We observe that the power consumption of both sensors and storage nodes grows linearly with the number of data items, which confirms our complexity analysis in Section X-A. Note that the number of collected data items is in direct proportion to the size of time-slots. For power consumption, in comparison with the S&L scheme, our experimental results show that for three-dimensional data, SafeQ-NC+ consumes 184.9 times less power for sensors and 76.8 times less power for storage nodes; SafeQ-MHT+ consumes 171.4 times less power for sensors and 46.9 times less power for storage nodes; SafeQ-NC consumes 59.2 times less power for sensors and 76.8 times less power for storage nodes; and SafeQ-MHT consumes 57.9 times less power for sensors and 46.9 times less power for storage nodes. For two-dimensional data, SafeQ-NC+ consumes 10.3 times less power for sensors and 9.0 times less power for storage nodes; SafeQ-MHT+ consumes 9.5 times less power for sensors and 5.4 times less power for storage nodes; SafeQ-NC consumes 2.7 times less power for sensors and 9.0 times less power for storage nodes; and SafeQ-MHT consumes 2.6 times less power for sensors and 5.4 times less power for storage nodes. Our experimental results conform with the theoretical analysis that the power consumption in S&L scheme grows exponentially with the number of dimensions, whereas in SafeQ it grows linearly with the number of dimensions times the number of data items.
Figs. 13(d) and 14(d) show the average power consumption for a 10-min slot for a sensor and a storage node, respectively, versus the number of dimensions of the data. We observe that there are almost linear correlations between the average power consumption for both sensors and storage nodes and the number of dimensions of the data, which also confirms our complexity analysis in Section X-A.
Our experimental results also show that SafeQ is comparable to the S&L scheme for one-dimensional data in terms of power and space consumption. For power consumption, SafeQ-NC+ consumes about the same power for sensors and 0.7 times less power for storage nodes; SafeQ-MHT+ consumes about the same power for sensors and 0.3 times less power for storage nodes; SafeQ-NC consumes 1.0 times more power for sensors and 0.7 times less power for storage nodes; and SafeQ-MHT consumes 1.0 times more power for sensors and 0.3 times less power for storage nodes. For space consumption on storage nodes, SafeQ-NC+ and SafeQ-MHT+ consume about the same space, and SafeQ-NC and SafeQ-MHT consume about 1.0 times more space. Fig. 15(a)-(c) shows the average space consumption of storage nodes for three-, two-, and one-dimensional data, respectively. For space consumption on storage nodes, in comparison to the S&L scheme, our experimental results show that for three-dimensional data, SafeQ-NC+ consumes 182.4 times less space; SafeQ-MHT+ consumes 169.1 times less space; SafeQ-NC consumes 58.5 times less space; and SafeQ-MHT consumes 57.2 times less space. For two-dimensional data, SafeQ-NC+ consumes 10.2 times less space; SafeQ-MHT+ consumes 9.4 times less space; SafeQ-NC consumes 2.7 times less space; and SafeQ-MHT consumes 2.6 times less space. The results conform with the theoretical analysis that the space consumption in the S&L scheme grows exponentially with the number of dimensions, whereas in SafeQ it grows linearly with the number of dimensions times the number of data items. Fig. 15 shows the average space consumption of storage nodes for each data item versus the number of dimensions of the data item. For each three-dimensional data item, S&L consumes about over 10 bytes, while SafeQ-NC+ and SafeQ-MHT+ consume only 40 bytes.
XII. CONCLUSION
We make three key contributions in this paper. First, we propose SafeQ, a novel and efficient protocol for handling range queries in two-tiered sensor networks in a privacy-and integrity-preserving fashion. SafeQ uses the techniques of prefix membership verification, Merkle hash trees, and neighborhood chaining. In terms of security, SafeQ significantly strengthens the security of two-tiered sensor networks. Unlike prior art, SafeQ prevents a compromised storage node from obtaining a reasonable estimation on the actual values of sensor collected data items and sink issued queries. In terms of efficiency, our results show that SafeQ significantly outperforms prior art for multidimensional data in terms of both power consumption and storage space. Second, we propose an optimization technique using Bloom filters to significantly reduce the communication cost between sensors and storage nodes. Third, we propose a solution to adapt SafeQ for event-driven sensor networks.
